By Jeffrey Tucker
Ludwig von Mises Institue
September 1997


The 50th anniversary of the Marshall Plan provided another occasion
for the media to celebrate the governments good works. The U.S.'s
headlong plunge into global welfarism (nearly $100 billion in
current dollars), they said, saved European economies after the
Second World War. One reporter, Garrick Utley of NBC, even theorized
that Marshall aid explains why East Germany was poor and West Germany rich.

As economist Tyler Cowen has noted, the countries that received the
most Marshall Plan money (allies Britain, Sweden, and Greece) grew
the slowest between 1947 and 1955, while those that received the
least money (axis powers Germany, Austria, and Italy) grew the most.
In terms of post-war prosperity, then, it eventually paid to be a
political enemy of the U.S. instead of a "beneficiary" of
international charity.

But this truth is only news if you think that the Marshall Plan was
genuinely intended to help foreign countries. But as with all
government programs, it pays returns to look beneath the surface. So
what exactly was the point of the Marshall Plan, named for General
George Marshall? It's been well-described in the works of historians
William Appleman Williams, Gabriel Kolko, Stephen Ambrose, and Alan Milward.

Marshall himself played the role of a patsy, delivering prepackaged
speeches written by the players behind the plan. His original pitch,
given at Harvard, was for money to end "hunger, poverty,
desperation, and chaos." But the real upshot of the Marshall Plan
was a political maneuver to loot American taxpayers to keep
influential American corporations on the government dole. The Plan's
legacy was the egregious and perpetual use of foreign aid for
domestic political and economic purposes.

After the war ended, Harry Truman's popularity in the polls began to
plummet, as did the prestige of government generally. The American
people had made huge sacrifices to fight the war and now wanted
curbs in government, which had been administering a centrally
planned economy. Most of all, they wanted the foreign policy
recommended by George Washington and Thomas Jefferson: trade with
all, entanglements with none.

In the mainstream of thinking was Republican Senator Robert Taft, a
hero of all free-market activists at the time. He demanded tax cuts,
spending cuts, and an end to "constantly increasing interference
with family life and with business by autocratic government bureaus
and autocratic labor leaders." The Republican party swept midterm
elections in 1946, taking back the Congress on a hard-core, anti-big
government platform.

Truman had to do something big and he knew it. As Charles Mee
reports, he needed "some large program that would let him recapture
the initiative, something big enough to enable him to gather in all
the traditional factions of the Democratic Party and also some
middle-of-the-road Republicans, and at the same time, something that
would hamper the Republican phalanx," and establish him as a world leader.

The issue was right before him: foreign aid, funneled through the
corporate establishment and cloaked in the rhetoric of opposition to
foreign (but not domestic) communism. Cynically, he would make good
use of Russia, which only the day before had been our gallant ally
in the war, and transform it into a monster that had to be
destroyed. By stealing the Republican's anti-socialist rhetoric,
Truman hoped to frazzle his opponents and make himself a hero on the
world stage.

Truman had plenty of co-conspirators, men who have gone down in
history as the architects of the original New World Order. Fabled
establishmentarians Averell Harriman and Charles Kindleberger were
central figures. But it was Dean Acheson, undersecretary of state
and the most menacing statist of the immediate post-war era, who
concocted the plan to make the wartime empire permanent. Acheson
persuaded Navy secretary James Forrestal and domestic fixer Clark
Clifford to show Truman how he could elevate a political scam like
foreign aid into a mighty ideological struggle on the global stage.
A little-known business group, founded in 1942 and called the
Committee for Economic Development, was elevated into a think tank
for a new international order--the economic counterpart to the
Council on Foreign Relations. The Committee's founders were the
heads of the top steel, automotive, and electric industries who had
benefitted from the New Deal's corporatist statism. Its membership
overlapped with the farther left National Planning Association,
which was unabashedly national socialist in ideological orientation.

These groups understood that they owed their profit margins to
government subsidies provided by the New Deal and wartime production
subsidies. Faced with post-war peace, they feared a future in which
they would be forced to compete on a free-market basis. Their
personal and institutional security was at stake, so they got busy
dreaming up strategies to sustain a profitable statism in a
peacetime economy.

Corporate economic interests, then, overlapped with Truman's
political interests, and an unholy alliance between business and
government was born. They would use Europe's miseries to line their
own pockets in the name of "rebuilding" and providing "security"
against trumped-up threats to American security.

The test case came in 1947 with aid to Greece, where a communist
party was making electoral advances. Truman saw the main chance, and
demanded $400 million in foreign aid, which Congress approved as a
swipe against Russia. Just as the money was being channeled to
special-interest groups, however, members of Congress learned that
the "Russian connection" to the Greek communist party had been
phonied up. As it turned out, Greece, like every European country,
just wanted the cash.

Even so, the political success of the Truman doctrine of global
giveaways had been demonstrated, and the script for billions in
future giveaways had been written. Over the next five years,
"Marshall money" would corrupt nearly every Christian democratic
party in Europe, turning them into carbon copies of the U.S.
democratic party. Those political parties in turn worked to create
monstrous welfare states and regulatory controls that continue to
hinder European economic growth today.

On the heels of the success in Greece, Dean Acheson formed an ad hoc
committee to find "situations elsewhere in the world" that "may
require analogous, technical, and military aid on our part." With no
effort, the ad hoc committee was able to classify most of Europe as
in need of economic aid. The committee found shortages of just about
everything, and, in particular, dollars to buy goods from corporate
America. A mythical "dollar shortage" (as if trade is only possible
with a world awash in paper) was the crisis of the moment.
But beneath the surface, the true objective was the
internationalization of the New Deal, a bureaucrat's dream. As
Julius Krug, secretary of the interior, said in his memoirs, the
Marshall Plan, "essential to our own continued productivity and
prosperity," was a Tennessee Valley Authority on a world scale. "It
is as if we were building a TVA every Tuesday."

Yet even after the Greece vote, polls showed tremendous public
opposition to any foreign giveaways. In one meeting, the Republican
House Majority Leader Charles Halleck told Truman flat out: "You
must realize there is a growing resistance to these programs. I have
been out on the hustings, and I know. The people don't like it."
The Truman gang had already thought of that. Months before the vote,
he brought together the heads of major corporations to enlist them
in the cause. Members of this organizing committee, drawn from the
Committee for Economic Development, included, most prominently,
Hiland Vatcheller, president of the Allegheny-Ludlum Steel
Corporation; W. Randolph Burgess, vice-chairman of National City
Bank of New York; Paul G. Hoffmann, president of Studebaker Corp.
(and later administrator of Marshall funds), as well as the
secretary treasurers of the AFL and the CIO.

Leading the corporate charge for secure profits was Will Clayton,
the Texas cotton impresario whose business was about to experience a
remarkable tax-subsidized boom. The last world war had already made
his company the second largest cotton-trading company in the world.
Unlike his competitors during the New Deal, while working with FDR
to wreck the American economy, he was smart enough to move his
operations to Brazil, Mexico, Paraguay, and Egypt. By the Second
World War, he was selling 15 percent of the world cotton crop.
As the war ended, he reenlisted in the campaign for the home front.
As undersecretary of state for economic affairs in 1947, Clayton too
saw the main chance. "Let us admit right off," he said in defense of
the idea of foreign aid: "We need markets--big markets--in which to
buy and sell." Here is the core truth of all such aid. The intent is
not to help foreign countries; it is to reward home-based
multinationals who actually get the cash as the government purchases
political influence abroad.

Nothing was left to chance. Acheson worked with the established
corporate elites and the State Department to create a supposed
grass-roots organization called "Citizens' Committee for the
Marshall Plan." As many as one thousand speakers representing the
group toured the country to whip up support. It also ghost-wrote
Congressional testimony from other organizations on behalf of the
aid package. As Averell Harriman told several European ambassadors
during a visit to the British embassy, they haven't seen anything
compared with the "flood of organized propaganda which the
Administration is about to unloose."

It was left to Will Clayton to make the economic case. Perversely,
he touted the Marshall Plan as the triumph of "free enterprise."
Moreover, he said, if communism comes to Europe, "I think the
situation which we would face in this country would be a very grave
one." We would "have to reorder and readjust our whole economy in
this country if we lost the European market."

In the days before the vote, the claims became more extreme and,
with the media-corporate-banking- government elite on board, the
propaganda became ever more hysterical. We were told that a
depression would come. The U.S. would be bombed. We'd be in another
war if the aid package failed. The situation is as bleak as it was
for France in 1938. American life as we know it would end forthwith.

When the plan passed, as it easily did (with even Taft's vote), the
ink was hardly dry on the legislation when the ships full of goods
hit the high seas. At any given moment over the next few months, 150
boats were carrying wheat, flour, cotton, tires, borax, drilling
equipment, tractors, tobacco, aircraft parts, and anything else big
domestic manufacturers could get their hands on.

As with most goods shipped under the Marshall Plan, American
producers had the advantage: 50 percent had to be sent on American
vessels. Oil exports to Europe exploded even as imports from Europe
were cut by one-third. In aid distribution, there was bias in favor
of finished goods, to prevent European businesses from competing
with American producers on down the production line.

Taking a leaf from the Roosevelt playbook, Truman bypassed the usual
bureaucracy and established a new bureau--the Economic Cooperative
Administration--to distribute the aid. It too was staffed by the
heads of major industrial-corporate interests who stood to benefit
at public expense. Paul Hoffman headed the group and passed out
billions to well-heeled corporate powers. As historian Anthony Carew
summarizes, the Marshall Plan "was in all major respects a business
organization run by businessmen." (Hoffman later became head of the
far-left Ford Foundation.)

Most of all, the aid was used for purchases at distorted prices by
American tax dollars in the hands of European governments. The mad
scramble for tax dollars was a disgrace to behold, creating a low
point in U.S. business history. Time and again, Congress intervened
to grant corporate America what it really wanted: restrictions that
forced Marshall aid to go to purchases of American oil, aluminum,
wood, textiles, and machines.

The aid was also used to directly subsidize particular firms in
recipient countries, whether or not there were viable markets for
their products. Instead, the firms received money because their
continued existence would artificially support "full employment"
policies. And since American labor union groups were intimately
involved in choosing who got the money, the lion's share went to
companies with closed union shops, paradoxically restricting the
ability of labor markets to readjust to new economic realities.
From an economic perspective, the Marshall Plan was modeled on a
static view of investment. Countries were asked what their present
needs were and the U.S. responded. Not a thought was given to the
possibility that economic growth alone would provide. It eventually
did, but only after the Marshall Plan welfare was cut off and
domestic manufacturers were able to find markets for their products.

The result was the largest peacetime transfer of wealth from the
taxpayers to corporations until that point in U.S. history. And it
wasn't only dollars that were exported. Through a massive and
tax-funded "technical expertise program," European businesses came
to the U.S. to take lessons in management practices, visiting mostly
unionized automobile companies, electric utility plants, and huge
farm operations--the most socialistic of U.S. sectors.

All told, the Marshall Plan dumped $13 billion, or nearly $100
billion in today's dollars. It was enough to firmly entrench
American companies in European markets, especially in Britain,
France, and Germany. American-controlled companies dominated
industries such as shoes, milk, cereals, machines, cars, canned
goods, petroleum refinement, locks and keys, printing, tires, soaps,
clocks, farm machinery, and much more.

These were mere bubbles of prosperity, forced investment created
through insider deals of the worst sort. Indeed, Hoffman worked
under the constant fear that the racketeering would come to the
surface. He feared some enterprising journalist might expose the
entire thing, hearings would follow, and the plan would be
discredited. That never happened.

A year after the Marshall Plan began sucking private capital out of
the economy, the U.S. fell into recession, precisely the opposite of
what its proponents predicted. Meanwhile, the aid did not help
Europe. What reconstructed Europe was the post-Marshall freeing up
of controlled prices, keeping inflation in check, and curbing union
power--that is, the free market. As even Hoffman admitted in his
memoir, the aid did not in fact help the economies of Europe. The
primary benefit was "psychological." Expensive therapy, indeed.

The actual legacy of the Marshall Plan was a vast expansion of
government at home, the beginnings of the Cold War rhetoric that
would sustain the welfare-warfare state for 40 years, a permanent
global troop presence, and an entire business class on the take from
Washington. It also created a belief on the part of the ruling elite
in D.C. that it could trick the public into backing anything,
including the idea that government and its connected interest groups
should run the world at taxpayer expense.

Jeffrey Tucker edits the The Free Market.